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Contribution Among Antitrust Violators: Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Na-
tional Beauty Supply, Inc.'—The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit re-
cently decided in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.
whether contribution was available, under any circumstances, to an antitrust.
defendant. The case arose out of a suit commenced by one wholesaler of
cosmetic supplies against a competitor for conspiring to monopolize a cosmet-
ics market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act.' The plaintiff, Pro-
fessional, alleged that defendant National had demanded an exclusive dealer-
ship contract from a manufacturer of beauty supplies, La Maur, Inc., and that
National's demands had caused Professional to be terminated as a La Maur
dealer. 3 During the initial stages of discovery, National filed a third party
complaint alleging that La Maur had been at least partially responsible for
Professional's termination.' Therefore, National argued, it was entitled to
contribution from La Maur in the event it was found liable to Professional.'
The district court. dismissed the third party complaint, holding as a mat-
ter of law that contribution was unavailable to National," and National ap-
pealed. The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed and HELD
that, at least under some circumstances, an antitrust defendant should he enti-
tled to contribution from those co-conspirators not sued by the plaintiff.' The
Professional court stressed that. its concern for fairness between the parties was
the deciding factor in its decision." Furthermore, the court stated that such a
rule need not adversely affect antitrust policy." The court therefore felt free
to fashion a new remedy based on what. it called "sense and justice. - 19
The Professional decision represents an abrupt break from the few cases
discussing the issue of contribution among antitrust defendants. Prior to Pro-
` 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
2 Id. at 1181. Additionally, the plaintiff made a claim under Minnesota antitrust
law. and also alleged that the defendant had tortionsly interfered with its business
relationship with La Maur..Inc., a manufacturer of beauty supplies.
3 hi. at 1180-81.
Id. at [181. On appeal. National stated that during discovery it became apparent
that Professional's entire claim was based on the alleged joint wrongdoing of La Maur
and National.
It was National's theory that since it had no control over La Mour's termination
of Professional, La Maur should be treated as the primary actor involved in the alleged
antitrust violation, and that National could be at most secondarily liable to Profes-
sional. Thus, in addition to a claim for contribution. National argued that it was enti-
tled to indemnification from La Maur. The circuit court treated the indemnification
issue relatively cursorily, holding that it was not available to an antitrust defendant. hi.
at 1186. In summary, the court reasoned that permitting a wrongdoer to escape loss
entirely by shifting liability to another party under the concept of indemnification
would result in the same unfairness as would the denial of contribution. Id. A full
treatment of the indemnification issue in this casenote would not be appropriate.
/d, at 1181. This was the court of appeals' conclusion: the district court's order
dismissing the third party complaint was not accompanied by an opinion.
' Id. at 1182.
/d. at 1185.
" Id. at I 185.
1 " Id. at	 185-86.
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ftssional, no other federal court had recognized an antitrust defendant's right
to contribution." This casenote will examine the Professional decision and
evaluate the policy considerations, underlying extension of the contribution
remedy to antitrust defendants. First, the article will present the rationale of
contribution generally. The policy arguments supporting and opposing con-
tribution will be isolated and the remedy's specific application to the antitrust
area will be examined. Second, the casenote will analyze the opinions pre-
sented by the majority and dissent in Professional. Here, the casenote will
scrutinize the reasoning of the judges and compare it with the approach re-
cently taken by other courts of appeals. It will be submitted that the rule
extending contribution to antitrust defendants adopted in Professional appro-
priately applies equitable standards without sacrificing the principles underly-
ing the antitrust statutes. Finally, alternative considerations which support the
Professional rule will be explored. These suggestions should be considered in
any future legislative or judicial scrutiny of the extension of the contribution
remedy to antitrust defendants.' 2
" Before the Professional decision, the question of contribution in antitrust cases
had been rarely considered. See Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution
Among Co-conspirators in Antitrust Treble Damage Actions, 31 FOKDHAM L. REV. 1 1 1 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Corbett]. The author reasoned that the dearth of case law was
attributable to the tendency of most antitrust defendants to settle their respective obli-
gations among themselves. The author also suggested that most plaintiffs join as many
defendants as may be expected to be liable so that the defendants themselves need not
bring any additional parties into the action. Id. at 111.
Professional discussed the prior federal law on the contribution in antitrust issue,
and mentioned only one court of appeals case, Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d
614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960) which had, in dictum, followed the traditional rule. The Profes-
sional court also cited the four district court opinions which had decided the issue, all
of them holding there was no right of contribution in antitrust cases. Olson Farms,
Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,698 (D. Utah 1977); Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc„ No. 75-2820 .(E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977)
(unpublished); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. II 61,533
(N.D. Cal. 1976); and Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Other district courts have approved the no contribution
rule in dictum. See, e.g., Baughman v. Cooper-Jarrett, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 671 (W.D. Pa.
1975), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976)
("We should note at this point that [the defendant] is not presenting a claim for con-
tribution against its two alleged co-conspirators. In fact, this antitrust action is gov-
erned by federal common law under which there is no right of contribution for inten-
tional torts." Id. at 698 n.3.); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D.
Ga. 1973) (arguably by implication); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280
F. Supp. 802, 804-05 (S.D. Cal. 1968) (arguably by implication). But see Chevalier v.
Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 145 n.6 (F.D. Pa. 1978) (dictum).
i2
 It appears that the Supreme Court will be deciding the contribution issue during
the current term. As this casenote went to press, the Supreme Court granted review in-
Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., No. 79-1144, 49 U.S.L.W. 3321 (Nov. 4,
1980). The decision below in Texas Industries, Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v.
Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), which held that antitrust defendants
have no right to contribution, is discussed infra in section III of this casenote.
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I. THE RATIONALE OF CONTRIBUTION
A. Generally
•	 Contribution involves the distribution of losses among tortfeasors by re-
quiring each to pay a share of the damages.' 3 Thus, if one tortfeasor is made
liable for more than his proportionate share of the plaintiff's damages, he
may seek contribution from joint tortfeasors for a portion of the damages." A
claim of contribution by one tortfeasor against another is premised on a con-
cern for fairness between wrongdoers; if they are jointly responsible for the
harm, then they should share the burden of liability. One federal court re-
cently offered the following rationale for allowing contribution:
13 Procedurally, this may be done in one of three ways: (I) after judgment has
been entered against one joint tortfeasor, he may bring a separate action for contribu-
tion against a joint tortfeasor; (2) before judgment, a joint tortfeasor may implead a
joint tortfeasor for contribution; and (3) a joint tortfeasor may counterclaim for con-
tribution against a joint tortfeasor named as a co-defendant by the plaintiff. See
Hodges, Contribution and Indemnity among Tortfeasors, 26 TEX. L. REV. 150, 166 -68
(1947) [hereinafter cited as Hodges]. Cf. ABA Antitrust Section's model legislation al-
lowing contribution to antitrust violators without regard to procedural niceties, re-
printed in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. E-1, E-3 (BNA) (October 25, 1979).
14 For example. if defendant A has been fobnd liable to the plaintiff in the
amount of $10,000, he could recover against B. who was also a tortfeasor, in the
amount of $5,000." Hodges, supra note 13, at 150-51.
There are at least two views regarding the proper division of the total liability when
contribution is allowed. Some courts have determined that liability should be shared on
a per capita basis, with each joint tortfeasor contributing the same amount regardless
of relative culpability. See Herzfield v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378
F. Supp. 112, 136 & n.58 (S,D,N.Y. 1974), affd in part, rev'd in part, 540 F.2t1 27 (2d
Cir. 1976); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). The chief advan-
tage of such a rule is its simplicity, yet it may lead to unfair results when the joint
tortfeasors are not equally to blame. For this reason, other authorities have criticized
the per capita approach, and have suggested that liability be shared according to the
comparative fault for the plaintiff's damages. See Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, 504 F.2d
400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394
F.2d 465, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1968). See also UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT (1977),
The ABA's Antitrust Section has suggested an approach similar to comparative
fault as part of its model legislation permitting contribution in antitrust cases. The
section advocates that damages be apportioned on the basis of relative responsibility
for the plaintiffs damages, a flexible concept encompassing the impact of a defen-
dant's acts as well as culpability. 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. E-1, E-4 (October
25, 1979).
Support for a relative fault rule has been expressed by the Supreme Court in
another context. In United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975), an
admiralty case, the Court stated:
It is no longer apparent, if it ever was, that this Solomonic division of
damages serves to achieve even rough justice. An equal division of dam-
ages is a reasonably satisfactory result only where each vessel's fault is ap-
proximately equal and each vessel thus assumes a share of the collision
damages in proportion to its share of the blame, or where proportionate
degrees of fault cannot be measured and determined on a rational basis.
The rule produces palpably unfair results in every other case.
Id. at 405.
972	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 21:969
The governing principle of contribution throughout has been that
one of two or more joint wrongdoers should not be required to pay
more than his share of a common burden, or to put it another way,
that no obligor should be unjustly benefited at the expense of
another.' 5
Contribution thus prevents one defendant from shouldering the entire bur-
den of a judgment alone and insures that other culpable parties do not escape
liability entirely."
The benefits of contribution stem largely from the limit which it effects
on a plaintiff's ability to control the identity of the person or persons who will
pay his damages. Without contribution, the plaintiff's decision regarding
which joint tortfeasors will be named as defendants is tantamount to a final
determination of who will bear this burden. Hence, the plaintiff has complete
and arbitrary control over the incidence of damages. For example, a plaintiff
could decide to sue one joint tortfeasor out of spite, preferring to saddle him
with the burden of satisfying the entire claim, 17 or a plaintiff might sue one
joint tortfeasor because of his superior ability to pay a judgment.'" Alterna-
tively, a plaintiff's decision to sue a particular defendant and not others could
be the result. of a collusive agreement between the plaintiff and the potential
defendants.'" In none of these examples is the plaintiff's determination to
sue or not based on the defendant's culpability. Rather, without contribution,
a plaintiff is armed with the arbitrary power of choosing defendants, and
therefore imposing potential liability, on whatever basis he desires. Contribu-
tion among joint tortfeasors prevents a plaintiff' from exercising such control:
a defendant. joint tortfeasor may seek contribution from all joint tortfeasors
regardless of whether they were sued originally by the plaintiff, and will un-
doubtedly clo so to reduce his own liability.
Despite its apparent equitable merit, the contribution remedy has been
criticized. Opponents of contribution have focused on the enhanced deter-
rence which abolition of contribution would arguably effect.'" They have
Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Stipp. 103, 170 (D. Del. 1974),
vacated on other grounds. . 535 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1976).
" Fur a general discussion of contribution see W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at
307 (4th ed. 1971): Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21 CoRNELL
L.Q. 552 (1930) [hereinafter cited its Bohlen]; Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130 (1932) [hereinafter cited as Lenart, Comment, Con-
tribution Among joint Tortfrasors. 44 TEx. L. REV. 320 (1905) [hereinafter cited as Com-
mend.
' 7 See Conies v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 405, 467-08 & 11.1 (3d Cir. [908).
' 8 See Olson Farms, Inc. V. Safeway Stores. Inc.. [1979-2] Trade Gas. 62.995
(10th Cir. 1979) (dissenting opinion), rehearing en bane granted, December 27. 1979.
19 Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.. 594 F.2(1 at
1185. See also the discussion of the abuses of the no contribution rule, at text at notes
100-09 infra.
2 " Another argument against contribution, which has sometimes been mentioned
by courts and commentators, is that wrongdoers, especially those who have acted in-
tentionally, should mu be able to avail themselves of legal relief in order to lessen the
burden of damages which they have caused. See. e.g., Fidelity • Gas. Co. v. Christen-
son, 183 Minn. 182. 184, 236 N.W. 618, 619 (193 I); Coln. & S
. P . K y . v. Calves-
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reasoned that a tortfeasor will be deterred from wrongdoing if he knows that
he can be forced to bear the entire burden of the judgment himself." Primar-
ily because of this concern for deterrence, the traditional federal common law
rule has been that contribution is prohibited between concurrent
wrongdoers." There is, however, a modern trend toward the broader avail-
ability of contribution. 23
 Modern courts have recognized that, at least in the
case of unintentional wrongdoing, the deterrence argument makes little sense;
Unless the parties actually contemplate an intentional wrongful act, whether
contribution subsequently is available to them will have no effect on the likeli-
hood of wrongdoing." Accordingly, the lower federal courts increasingly
have rejected the traditional rule, and recognize the contribution principle in
a variety of areas."
Some jurisdictions, by statute, have gone even further than the judiciary
in recognizing the right to contribution. Eighteen states have statutes allowing
contribution to intentional tortfeasors." These states evidently were per-
suaded that the advantages of contribution outweighed the potential harm to
deterrence. Also of significance, a similar number of states have established a
statutory right to contribution among unintentional tortfeasors, bringing to 37
ton, H. & S. A. Ry., 83 Tex. 509, 515, 18 S.W. 956, 958 (1892); Comment, Contribution
and Indemnity Among Joint Tortfeasors, 33 TENN. L. Rev. 184, 199 (1966); Bohlen, supra
note 16 at 557; Leflar, supra note 16, at 134; Comment, supra note 16, at 329-30.
21 W. PROSSF,R, LAW OF TORTS § 50, at 307 (4th ed. 1971).
22 Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 196 U.S. 217,
227-28 (1905). See also citations at note 16 supra.
" Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv. Inc., 318 F. Stipp, 955, 957 (S.D.N,Y. 1970),
affd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
24 The early English law recognized this, and disallowed contribution only among
unintentional wrongdoers. See Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng.
Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66, 130 Eng. Rep. 693 (1827). The
American courts, however, lost sight of the distinction between intentional and unin-
tentional tortfeasors, and flatly prohibited the remedy. See Union Stock Yards Co. v.
Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co.. 196 U.S. 217, 227-28 (1905); Ruder, Multiple
Defendants in Securities Law Fraud Cases: Aiding and Abetting, Conspiracy. In Pali Delicto,
Indernnificatim and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597, 647-48 (1972).
25 "Departing from the rugged flintiness of traditional common law, the general
drift of the law today is toward the allowance of contribution among joint tortfeasors."
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc.. 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.O.N.Y. 1970). See
also Heizer Corp. v. Ross, 601 F.2d 330 (7th Cir. 1979) (contribution allowed in se-
curities case); Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, lnc., 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975) (contribution available in aviation collisions); Gimes v. Brodhurst,
394 F.2d 4(35 (3d Cir. 1968) (contribution allowed in ordinary negligence case); Kiwi]
v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1940) (contribution allowed in ordinary negligence
case); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co,. 385 F. Supp. 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (contribution allowed in securities case). Still, few courts have been
willing to judicially extend the availability of contribution to intentional tortfeasors.
The exceptions have been in the federal securities area. See note 74 infra.
2 " Seventeen states have statutes that are silent on the issue of whether contribu-
tion applies when the tort is intentional, and New York specifically allows contribution
for intentional tort feasors. It would appear that in these states an intentional tort feasor
could obtain contribution. S. REP. No. 06-428, Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of
1979, 96th Cong„ 1st Sess., reprinted in 942 ANTITRusT & TRADE REC. REP. 1, 5 (BNA)
(December 6, 1079).
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the total number of states which recognize by statute some form of contribu-
don 57
The Supreme Court's decisions on the contribution issue parallel the
trend elsewhere toward its availability. Since the 1950's, the Court has heard
two cases, both in admiralty, involving the availability of' the contribution rem-
edy. In the first, it was denied. In a similar case decided 20 years later, the
Court allowed contribution.
In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.," decided in 1952,
an employee of Haenn was injured on board Halcyon's ship while making
repairs. The employee sued Halcyon for negligence, and Halcyon impleaded
Haenn as a third party defendant. The Court did not allow Halcyon's claim
for contribution, reasoning that no right of contribution existed at common
law, and that in the absence of congressional action it would be unwise to
fashion a new judicial rule of contribution.'" The Court also noted that the
third party defendant in Halcyon was immune to suit from the original plain-
tiff by way of a workman's compensation act."" Thus, the purpose of the act
would be defeated if contribution were allowed."t
In Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 32
 which, like Halcyon,
concerned the availability of contribution in a non-collision maritime action
for personal injuries, no workman's compensation act was involved. The
Court allowed contribution in Cooper, anti limited the Halcyon holding to cases
where the tortfeasor against whom contribution is sought is immune from
liability by statute. 33
 No such bar against contribution existed on the facts of
Cooper. The Court stated:
Unlike the injured worker in Halcyon, [the injured plaintiff] was
not an employee of Cooper and could have proceeded against either
the Vessel [the defendant] or Cooper [the third party defendant] or
both of them to recover full damages for his injury. Had [he] done
so, either or both of the defendants could have been held responsi-
ble for all or part of the damages. Since [he] could have elected to
make Cooper bear its share of the damages caused by its negligence,
we see no reason why the Vessel should not be accorded the same
right."'
The Cooper decision thus limits Halcyon to its particular facts. The Court
suggested in Cooper that unless countervailing considerations are present, it
27
 Id. See also Note, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682,
698 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Cornell Note].
" 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
29
 Id. at 285.
3"
 The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905
(1976), prescribes that liability under the Act shall be exclusive, and in place of all
other liability of the employer to the employee.
31 342 U.S. at 286 & n.12.
32
 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
33 Id. at 109-11.
34
 Id. at 113.
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would allow a defendant. to seek contribution from joint tortfeasors, at least in
the admiralty context. The result of Cooper, at minimum, is a recognition by
the Supreme Court that contribution may be permitted among joint
tortfeasors where appropriate. 35
B. Contribution in Antitrust Cases
The federal antitrust statutes provide no express right of contribution.
Moreover, because antitrust actions sound in tort," it was established until
recently that an antitrust violator, under the principle of joint and several
liability, was considered liable for damages attributable both to his anticom-
petitive conduct and for damages caused by all co-conspirators." Under the
trebling provisions of the Clayton Act," an antitrust defendant thus faced
possible liability for three times the amount of damages caused by all the
defendants combined. Clearly, the no contribution rule carried the potential
for extreme penalties for antitrust violators.
The argument. against allowing contribution in antitrust cases is based on
the co ncern that it may adversely affect antitrust enforcement in two ways.
First, it is possible that the deterrent. effect of a private treble damages ac-
tion" might be reduced if contribution were allowed. Deterrence of anticom-
petitive conduct is based upon "potential liability running into millions of dol-
lars, - which provides the chief "[incentive] to 'voluntary' compliance with the
law." 4 " The concept of sharing damages would appear to be in conflict with
this rationale. Contribution would prevent the possibility that an antitrust vio-
lator could be forced to bear the entire burden of a judgment, thus ameliorat-
3•  The following language front Cooper illustrates the Court's view:
[A] "more equal distribution of justice" can best be achieved by ameliorat-
ing the common-law rule against contribution which permits a plaintiff to
force one of two wrongdoers to bear the entire loss though the other may
have been equally or more to blame.
417 U.S. at Ill.
3" Courts have uniformly treated private antitrust suits as tort actions. Wilson P.
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 900 n.5 (5th Cir. 1979).
But see Cornell Note, supra note 27, at 692-97, where the author argued that civil
antitrust actions are more closely akin to actions in quasi-contract.
37 See, e.g., El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co., [1977-I] Trade Cas. Si 61,533
(N.). Cal. 1976); Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F.
Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Contra, Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National
Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
38
 Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that private antitrust plaintiffs may re-
cover treble their actual damages as well as costs and attorney's fees. 15 U.S.C. § 15
(1976).
3" The importance of the treble damage action is magnified by the fact that the
only other means of private enforcement available to a plaintiff is an action for an
injunction authorized by Section 16 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
" L. SCHWARTZ & J. Fl.YNN, ANTITRUST AND REGULATORY ALTERNATIVES 24 (5th
ed. 1977). See also I Hearings on The Antitrust Improvements Act of 1975 before  the Sen.
Subcomm. on Antitrust & Monopoly, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 385 (1975) (table of major
recent antitrust awards to private plaintiffs), reprinted in L. SCHWARTZ & J. FLYNN,
supra, at 24,
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ing the treble penalty. A potential violator might be more likely to engage in
illegal activity knowing that, if he is sued individually, he could seek contribu-
tion from his co-conspirators."
The second negative effect of contribution, which is more acute in the
antitrust area than in the usual tort case, is the probability that it would
further complicate already complex lawsuits and discourage private actions. In
Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois , 42
 the Supreme Court suggested that it considered
the complexity of antitrust litigation to be a major concern." Illinois Brick
presented a standing issue, with the Court holding that only direct purchasers
from a price-fixer have standing to bring the action." One of the reasons
for the Court's view was its fear that suits brought by indirect purchasers
would result in overly complex antitrust trials." The Court referred to the
effect complexity could be expected to have on the plaintiff's costs, and con-
cluded that in light of the "longstanding policy of encouraging vigorous pri-
vate enforcement of the antitrust laws," 48 the methods of enforcement should
be limited so as to prevent undue complexity." The same concerns are
applicable relative to contribution. The introduction of additional parties into
antitrust litigation will almost always result in increased cost and delay to the
plaintiff.
The complication of lawsuits caused by contribution could adversely af-
fect the congressional policy of encouraging private antitrust actions" in
another way. It has been suggested that allowing an antitrust plaintiff to bring
an action against the party or parties he chooses enhances the attractiveness of
the suit.'" If contribution were allowed, a plaintiff would lose the ability to
limit the suit to particular parties, and a defendant seeking contribution from
joint tortfeasors could change the character of the plaintiff's original action. It
is possible that the lawsuit could escalate out of the plaintiff's control, thereby
discouraging private enforcement."
41
 This reasoning is merely an echo of the argument used against allowing con-
tribution in ordinary tort actions, namely that it will reduce deterrence. See text at
note 21 supra.
42 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
43 See id., at 745.
44 Id. at 746.
Id. at 743 n.27.
4 " Id. at 745.
47 Id. See also Hawaii v. Standard'Oil of Cal., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life
Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968) (private suits a
"bulwark" of antitrust enforcement).
" Individuals were first given the right to bring actions for damages caused by
antitrust violations under Section 7 of the Sherman Act, which was conceived of as a
remedy for "[Ole people of the United States as individuals. - 21 (;one. Rec. 1767-68
(1890) (remarks of Senator George). See also note 47 SUP&
4"
 Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Stipp. 1339,
1346 (S.D.N.V. 1969).
There is obvious merit in the argument that without. contribution a plaintiff may
exercise more effective control over his action. Such control. however, is the very
source of the unfairness of the no contribution rule. See text at notes 17-19 supra. No
plaintiff, notwithstanding the positive collateral effects of the no contribution rule,
should have the opportunity to dispense justice on whatever basis he desires.
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Of the cases which have decided the contribution issue in an antitrust
context, only two did more than invoke the traditional rule barring contribu-
tion. Both of these courts, because of their concern that contribution might
reduce antitrust deterrence and discourage private suits, rejected making con-
tribution available to antitrust defendants. The first case to directly consider
the issue was Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 51 which in-
volved an alleged price-fixing conspiracy among maritime firms. The plaintiff
settled with certain co-conspirators, and a non-settling defendant sought to
implead the settling parties for contribution. The court dismissed the third
party complaint, reasoning that if a defendant could implead all other co-
conspirators, control over the lawsuit would be taken out of the plaintiff's
hands. The court believed that the plaintiff should be allowed to sue only
those defendants it chose in order to fully carry out the statutory purpose of
the antitrust laws."
The second district court decision, El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.,"
also refused to allow contribution to an antitrust defendant: El Camino con-
cluded that allowing contribution would be inconsistent with antitrust policy.
The court reasoned first that the congressional policy in favor of private an-
titrust suits would be undermined if a plaintiff could not control the scope of
the lawsuit by determining the parties. 54 Second, the court believed that the
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws might be harmed if a defendant could
redistribute the cost of an antitrust violation:" While the court conceded that
there were persuasive arguments in favor of contribution, it believed justice
would be better served if it was unavailable in an antitrust case.'"
II. PROFESSIONAL BEAUTY SUPPLY, INC.
A. Majority Opinion
Although existing precedent and significant policy reasons conflicted with
the judicial extension of contribution into the antitrust area, the Eighth Cir-
cuit adopted an approach in Professional which balanced the equities served by
contribution against the potential harm to antitrust. policy. The Professional
court was convinced that contribution would not necessarily interfere with an-
titrust enforcement. Furthermore, the court believed that. the availability of
contribution would prevent. serious injustice to antitrust defendants. To sup-
port its unprecedented holding, the Professional majority relied upon the Su-
5 ' 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
52 Id. at 1346. The Sabre Shipping court reasoned:
If one or iwo defendants sued by a plaintiff ... could turn around and
iniplead all other persons directly and indirectly involved in the alleged
conspiracy, it could well spell death to the plaintiffs suit and thus thwart
the statutory purpose, Plaintiff's choice to site those of the defendants it
considers most culpable or most capable of making hits whole would be
totally nullified, and control of his action would be taken out of his hands.
Id.
11977-1] Trade Gas. 11 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
" hi. at 72,112.
Id.
70; Id_
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preme Court's reasoning in Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc.,." that con-
tribution may be allowed in appropriate cases without express direction from
Congress.''" The court also drew support from other federal court decisions
allowing contribution under various circumstances.'"
Al the outset of its discussion, the court. disposed of the argument that.
Congress intended that contribution be unavailable to antitrust violators. Al-
though it is true that the antitrust acts contain no provision for contribution,
the Professional court was not persuaded that the silence of Congress should
be read as indicating an intent to deny contribution to antitrust. defendants."
Given the absence of any clear expression by Congress, the court considered
the issue to be a matter of conjecture. "'
Next, contrary to the views expressed in the earlier cases which had con-
sidered the contribution issue, the Professional court did not believe that the
availability of contribution would discourage private antitrust suits. The court
noted that a district court has the power to control any action by severing
issues and parties, if the need arises, under Fed. R. Civ, P. 42(b). 62
 If the
addition of other parties to the action threatened to disrupt or overcomplicate
the lawsuit, a plaintiff could resort to the remedies made available by Rule
42(b). The court observed that, on the facts before it, the plaintiff apparently
perceived no danger from the third-party complaint, and had made no objec-
tion to the addition of La Maur as a third-party defendant. 63
Finally, the court considered the argument that contribution would inter-
fere with the deterrent effect of the treble damage action. The court con-
ceded that the possibility of being held liable for the full amount of an anti-
trust recovery represents a substantial deterrent to anticompetitive behavior.
Nonetheless, the Professional court believed that the question of deterrence cut
both ways, and that on balance the allowance of contribution provided a more
significant deterrent." This view was based on the court's observations that
if only one tortfeasor is made liable, all other joint tortfeasors necessarily go
"scot free," 65 and that a large or powerful tortfeasor might be able to influ-
" 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
5B The Professional court quoted the text of note 35 from Cooper, 594 F.2d at 1183.
" 594 F.2d at 1184. The Professional court cited many of the decisions appearing
in note 25.
"" Id. at 1183-84.
" 1 As the Professional court saw the matter, arguing for the proposition that Con-
gress intended to exclude contribution in antitrust. cases were: first, that. Congress had
provided for contribution in the Securities Acts, see 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976); 15
U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976); 15 U.S.C. § 780)) (1976), but made no such provision in the
antitrust laws, and second, that Congress had not acted in the face of the longstanding
rule that contribution is not available in antitrust cases.
The majority believed that. those arguments were effectively countered hy, first., the
fact that the antitrust statutes are not comprehensive or exclusive, and second, that the
contribution issue was raised so infrequently as to make congressional consideration
unlikely. Id.
"2 Id. at 1184-85.
" 3 Id. at 1184.
" Id. at 1185.
" Id. See Corbett, supra note 11, at 137.
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ence a plaintiff not 10 name it as a defendant. The court's notion was that the
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws may be reduced because a tortfeasor
knows there is a chance he may escape all responsibility and liability for an
antitrust violation. What made this possibility even more offensive, from the
court's viewpoint, was that a defendant may he able to use economic influence
to achieve such a result. The court noted that this was exactly what the de-
fendant National claimed to have happened." The majority concluded that.
by automatically prohibiting contribution among antitrust defendants in all
circumstances, a significant number of violators would be allowed to escape
liability for their wrongdoing, thereby undermining the policy of the antitrust.
laws."
The majority did not go so Far as to hold contribution available to all
defendants regardless of the nature of their conduct. Rather, the court re-
jected only the fixed rule that automatically prohibited contribution in all
cases." The court held that the availability of contribution was subject to a
district court's discretion after consideration of all the circumstances of the
case." To guide a district court's inquiry, the majority cited Justice White's
concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,"
which described factors of importance in considering whether an in pari delicto
defense was available to an antitrust defendant.. 7 ' There Justice White wrote:
[F]acts as to the relative responsibility for originating, negotiating,
and implementing the scheme; evidence as to who might reasonably
have been expected to benefit from the provision or conduct making
the scheme illegal ...; proof of whether one party attempted to ter-
minate the arrangement. and encountered resistance or counter-
measures from the other; facts showing who ultimately profited or
suffered from the arrangement."
Thus, the court contemplated a close examination of a defendant's behavior
and the circumstances surrounding the violation, before a trial court made
contribution available. The court concluded by observing that contribution in
favor of the defendant National was possible at this stage of the proceedings,
and that the district court had erred in dismissing National's third party com-
plaint." While the Professional majority held that contribution was not availa-
ble irrespective of a particular defendant's behavior, the court chose not to
"" 594 F.2d at 1185. As part of its brief, National submitted excerpts of depositions
taken of one of the principals of Professional which indicated that both La Maur and
National were perceived as wrongdoers by Professional, and that the reason La Maur
was not sued originally was because Professional was getting La Mattr's line of prod-
ucts back. Brief for Appellant at 7.
17 594 F.2d at 1185.
"" Id. at t 186.
6" Id.
7" 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
71 594 F.2d at 1186 n.8.
72 Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. at 146-47.
73 594 F.2d at 1186.
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make a clean distinction between intentional and unintentional violations. To
do so, in the court's view, would decrease the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws. The court was persuaded that even intentional violators should be able
to obtain contribution to insure that other violators would not escape liabil-
ity. 74
B. Dissent
The Professional opinion was decided over a strong dissent, 75 wherein
Judge Hanson criticized the majority's decision to make contribution available
to an intentional wrongdoer. The dissent noted that the trend in favor of
contribution had extended, generally speaking, only to negligent tortfeasors.
Because the defendant, National, would have to be found to have violated the
antitrust laws intentionally before it could be found liable, Judge Hanson
reasoned that National was in a poor position to complain of the unfairness of
being held solely liable for the antitrust violation. 76
The Professional dissent also expressed the familiar concern that the de-
terrent effect of the antitrust laws would be diminished by a rule allowing
contribution, and also suggested that a plaintiff might be unable to maintain
control over his lawsuit if defendants could implead other parties for con-
tribution. 77 Finally, Judge Hanson believed that the court should have
awaited Congressional directive on this issue, especially in the absence of
strong policy reasons in favor of contribution. 78
III. A COMPARISON OF PROFESSIONAL W!TH OTHER APPROACHES
The vitality of the Professional decision in future antitrust litigation has
been cast into doubt by two subsequent circuit court decisions which declined
to follow Professional's lead. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the contribution issue in Wilson P. Abraham Construction Corp. v. Texas
Industries, Inc., 7 " and held that no right of contribution is available to an anti-
trust defendant."" More recently, in Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,"
74 Id, In favor of the proposition that contribution should be available to inten-
tiona] as well as unintentional antitrust violators, the Professional court cited securities
cases which had allowed contribution to intentional wrongdoers. Odeue v. Shearson,
Hamlin & Co., 394 F. Su pp. 946, 958 (S.D,N.Y. 1975); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick. Mitchell S.: Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Globus, Inc. v.
Law Research Sere., Inc., 318 F. Stipp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
" Judge Hanson concurred with the majority's decision to deny indemnity to Na-
tional. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc, v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2(1 at
1188.
7 " Id. at 1188-89.
77 Id. at 1189-90.
78
 Id. at 1190. The argument that contribution should be made available to anti-
trust defendants by Congress, if at all, is supported by the observation that the major-
ity of jurisdictions which permit contribution have done so by statute.
7" 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 899.
" [1979-2] Trade Gas.	 62,995 (10th (.:ir. 1979), rehearing en bane granted, De-
cember 27, 1979.
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the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit also declined to change the pre-
vailing rule.
The original suit in Abraham was brought against a single defendant for
damages arising out of an alleged price-fixing scheme involving other co-
conspirators who were not sued by the plaintiff." The defendant, Texas
Industries, filed a third party complaint against these co-conspirators seeking
contribution." The case was presented to the Fifth Circuit after the district.
court dismissed the defendant's third party complaint.
The court in Abraham focused on the effect which a rule allowing con-
tribution could be expected to have on deterring anticompetitive business be-
havior. The court rejected the contention made successfully in Professional that
allowing contribution would enhance the deterrent effect of the antitrust
laws." On the contrary, the court sided with the traditional view that the no
contribution rule best promoted deterrence, and drew upon "prevailing
economic theory" that. business managers are more likely to be deterred by
the slight chance of a large loss to support its decision." The court con-
cluded, in a split decision, that antitrust policy would be better served by' de-
nying contribution to an antitrust defendant, and accordingly refused to allow
contribution to Texas I ndustries." 7
The Olson Farms decision was notable for its unwillingness to grapple with
the difficulties of accommodating contribution to antitrust policy. In Olson
Farms, the plaintiff, having already satisfied a judgment against it for conspir-
ing in violation of Sections I and 2 of the Sherman Act," sought a declara-
82 604 F.2d an 899. The defendant and others were allegedly involved in a conspir-
acy. to raise and stabilize the price of concrete in the New Orleans area. The plaintiff




 Irl. at 901. The defendant, Texas Industries, made the argument that had been
accepted in Professional, i.e., that the possihility of escaping all liability under the no
contribution rule might cause many potential violators to he more willing to engage in
wrongful activity.
R"
86 The Court noted:
ECIMIMRStS have argued that business managers, particularly in larger or-
ganizations, are generally "risk averse"—that is, they are deterred more by
the slight prospect of a large loss than by the strong prospect of a small
loss. 11 this hypothesis is correct, application of the rule denying contribu-
tion should inhibit those managers who are aware of the rule from par-
ticipating in unlawful group activity. Although the rule decreases the
likelihood that an individual participant will be held liable, it increases the
size of the potential liability.
Id. at 1)01 n.8. (poling Cornell Note, supra note 27, at 702. See also K. ELZINGA	 W.
BREITT, THE ANTITRUST PENALTI ES 120-2!1 (11176).
87 604 F.2d at 1105-06. The dissent in Abraham, noting the trend toward allowing
contribution to unintentional tort feasors, would have allowed contribution in the case
of an unintentional antitrust violator.
" The jury found that Olson Farms had violated both Sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act which prohibit price-fixing and monopolization, respectively. [1979-21
Trade Cas. at 79,700 5.. n.4.
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tory judgment that it was entitled to contribution against several of its co-
conspirators.'" The plaintiff, Olson Farms, alleged that without contribution
its co-conspirators would be unjustly enriched by the amount of the antitrust
judgment against Olson Fa rms which was attributable to their acts." The
district court dismissed the complaint for contribution, and Olson Farms ap-
pealed.
In discussing the plaintiff's claim for contribution, the court of appeals
emphasized that it believed Congress would be better able to decide the com-
plex policy question of allowing contribution in antitrust actions. The court
was unsure of the effects contribution would have on antitrust enforcement,
and without Congressional direction it declined to change the prevailing
rule."' In a 2-I decision, the Tenth Circuit panel affirmed the district court's
dismiSsal of Olson Farms' complaint." 2
The decision of the Abraham and Olson Farms courts not to allow contribu-
tion to an antitrust defendant can be best explained by the attitude toward the
contribution remedy reflected in the courts' opinions. Discussion of the in-
creased equities obtained by a rule allowing contribution was nonexistent in
Abraham and Olson Farms. In contrast, a recognition of the equitable need for
contribution was the starting point in Professional. The Professional court then
engaged in a balancing process. The contribution principle, which achieves
fairness among antitrust defendants by allowing the damages caused by an
anticompetitive conspiracy to be assessed against all parties to the illegal
" Olson Farms is a prime example of the extreme inequity possible under the no
contribution rule. Olson Farms' claim for contribution against its co-conspirators arose
out of a scheme . engaged in by Olson Farms and the defendants that lowered the
wholesale price the conspirators were to pay certain egg producers for their eggs.
Initially, fourteen egg producers brought an action against Olson Farms and one other
co-conspirator, Oakdell Egg Farms, Inc. Injunctive relief was later granted against
Oakdell, leaving Olson Farms, under the principle of joint and several liability, liable
for the full amount of the damages caused by all the conspirators together.
Although Olson Farms was allegedly responsible for less than 1/8 of the claimed
damages, or $99,656, by way of the trebling provisions of the antitrust laws, plus at-
torneys' fees, costs and interest, Olson Farms eventually satisfied a judgment in excess
of $2.4 million, or almost 25 times the amount of damages it had caused to the origi-
nal plaintiffs. See table below stating the claimed damages attributable to each defen-
dant and Olson Farms.
Egg Buyer	 Claimed Damages
Safeway Stores, Inc.
Egg Products Co.












9 ' Id. at 79,704. The Olson Farms majority opinion was in agreement with the Pro-





scheme, was weighed against two essential aspects of federal antitrust
policy—the effective deterrence of anticompetitive behavior and the con-
tinued attractiveness of the private action as a method of antitrust enforce-
me nt
Neither the Abraham nor. Olson Farms court expressed a desire to allow
contribution to an antitrust defendant. The majority in Abraham, unlike their
counterparts deciding Professional, disparaged any consideration of "fairness
between the parties." 93 For example, the Abraham court noted in relation to
allowing contribution to unintentional antitrust violators: "[W]e refuse to dis-
tort the antitrust laws in order to remedy a problematic inequity." "4 It is
evident that the court was not concerned that an antitrust defendant might
have to pay exorbitant damages unfairly. No mention is made by the Abraham
court of the considerable equitable arguments in favor of a rule allowing con-
tribution. The Tenth Circuit court, likewise, was indifferent to the heavy bur-
den that was imposed on Olson Farms as a result of the no contribution
rule."
Unlike the Eighth Circuit in Professional, which had conceded that allow-
ing contribution might hinder antitrust enforcement" and applied a balanc-
ing test, the Fifth and Tenth Circuits evaluated claims that antitrust policy is
actually promoted by allowing contribution. 97 Their analysis involved putting
the no contribution rule head-to-head with a rule allowing contribution to see
which one better promotes antitrust policy. 98 By approaching the issue in
this way, the Abraham and Olson Farms courts ignored the injustice which can
result to a defendant if contribution is barred. Whereas a no contribution rule
may be more effective in terms of purely promoting antitrust policy, the criti-
cal question for the courts should be: given the substantial fairness gained by
making contribution available to antitrust defendants, to what extent does
contribution infringe on the objectives of antitrust policy? The Professional
court engaged in such an analysis, which yielded the answer that, if carefully
managed, contribution need not have an adverse effect on antitrust policy.
The other two courts short-circuited their reasoning by failing to weigh the
advantages of the contribution remedy, and thus dictated the outcome of
their decisions.
93 Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at
1185.	 -
"' 604 F.2d at 906.
95 See note 89 supra.
911 The Professional court stated that the "question of deterrence cuts both ways,"
594 F.2d at 1185, and observed at various points in its opinion that the potentially
negative effects of allowing contribution to antitrust defendants could be controlled by
the exercise of district court discretion. Id. at 1184 - 85.
97 The following language in the Professional opinion may have prompted the Ab-
raham and Olson Farms courts to approach the problem in this way: "We are convinced
that the result of automatically prohibiting contribution „ would be to allow a sig-
nificant number of antitrust violators to escape liability for their wrongdoing and
thereby undermine the policy of the antitrust laws." 594 F.2e1 at 1185.
99 Similarly, Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Stipp.
1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). decided the contribution issue without recognizing the more
equitable treatment received by antitrust defendants under a rule allowing contribu-
tion.
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IV. EVALUATION
The contribution rule propounded by the Eighth Circuit in Professional
prevents an instigator of an anticompetitive scheme, or a defendant who stood
to gain the majority of the benefits thereunder, from obtaining contribu-
tion."" At the same time, however, the court's rule extends the contribution
remedy to intentional antitrust violators. This middle ground position, be-
tween allowing contribution to all antitrust defendants and allowing contribu-
tion to unintentional violators only, strikes an optimal balance between the
increased equity gained by contribution and the need to retain the maximum
deterrent effect of the antitrust laws for flagrant offenders. If any defendant.,
no matter how wilful or flagrant, could obtain contribution, the deterrent el-
feet of the treble damages might be decreased. Moreover it would simply be
unfair, in some cases, to allow a defendant to decrease its liability by implead-
nig less culpable parties. Under the Professional rule, a district court may pre-
vent such undesirable results by limiting the availability of contribution to
cases where it was satisfied only relatively blameless parties would benefit.
As part of the same standard, the Professional majority would permit in-
tentional violators to obtain contribution. judge Hanson criticized this part of
the majority's decision in his dissent to Professional, where he observed that
the trend in favor of contribution has still generally adhered to the rule that
intentional wrongdoers should not be permitted contribution,'" Not-
withstanding this criticism, there are two practical reasons for the majority's
view. First, a civil violation of the antitrust laws may be established by proof of
either an unlawful purpose or an anticompetitive effect.'" Thus, the nature
of a plaintiffs proof may determine whether the defendant is viewed as an
intentional or unintentional violator. The availability of contribution should
not depend on the manner in which a private suitor attempts to establish civil
.liability under the antitrust laws. Second, the issue of intent in antitrust cases
historically has been a matter of difficulty.' 02 Unlike the simple bright-line
distinction that can he made between negligent and intentional wrongdoers in
ordinary tort actions, distinguishing between intentional and unintentional an-
titrust violators is .a difficult. task. The practical effect of attempting such a
distinction would inject an additional difficult issue into antitrust litigation.
Instead of focusing on the intentional/unintentional dichotomy, the Pro-
fessional rule emphasizes the circumstances of each case. Under the majority's
rationale, contribution would be available to an intentional violator, but not to
"" See the discussion of Justice White's considerations in Perma Life in text at notes
08-72 supra.
X 10 See W. PROSSER, LAW Or ToRTs, § 50, at 308 (4th ed. 1971).
l' United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333. 337 (1969) (civil case). Whereas
intent is a necessary element of a criminal antitrust offense, civil liability may arise for
unimentional violations. United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 n.13 (1978);
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc. 604 F.2d at 9t 9 n.I (dissenting
opinion).
"'2 See, e.g., L.. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST §§ 33-39, at 94-105 (1977). The author dis-
cusses three distinct theories of intern to monopolize.
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a wilful or flagrant violator. By retaining the no contribution rule for these
offenders, the court's approach is defensible in terms of antitrust policy, yet it
also takes practical account of the fact that the question of an antitrust vio-
lator's intent may be difficult to answer.
The facts of Professional illustrate the sense of the majority's approach.
On one hand, if contribution was automatically unavailable to an intentional
antitrust violator, then the alleged co-conspirator, La Maur, would be allowed
to go scot free while National, an alleged intentional wrongdoer, faced possi-
ble treble damages. This result would obtain despite La Maur's alleged equal
responsibility for the plaintiff's damages. On the other hand, if the district
court made contribution available to National, La Maur would be brought into
the action to face liability', thereby promoting antitrust policy, while National
escaped sole liability. Contribution in such a case would benefit a non-flagrant
violator, but not at the expense of antitrust goals.
Apart from the particular rule of contribution established by Professional,
the reasonableness of which has been demonstrated above, was the court's
revolutionary decision to allow contribution to antitrust defendants in any
form. While the court itself chose to rest this part of its decision primarily on
the compelling logic of the contribution remedy, three other considerations
provide support for the court's decision to discard the fixed no contribution
rule in antitrust cases. First, the prevailing no contribution rule is susceptible
to abuse.'" Second, contribution may actually promote deterrence—an ar-
gument that some courts in the securities area have espoused.'" Third, the
ABA and a Congressional Committee have recognized, subsequent to Profes-
sional, the merit of allowing contribution to antitrust defendants.'°'
The prevailing rule barring contribution among antitrust defendants can
be used by both antitrust violators and private plaintiffs to subvert the policy
and intent of the antitrust statutes. An antitrust violator with muscle in the
business arena is in a formidable bargaining position under the no contribu-
tion rule. Because the rule barring contribution grants a plaintiff the arbitrary
power of choosing which violator to make liable, a plaintiff is particularly sus-
ceptible to the influence of a well-situated defendant, who could avoid liability
by promising a continuing business relationship in the future. Thus, a large
corporation could not only instigate an anticompetitive scheme which included
other companies,'" it could then reap the benefits of such a scheme without
penalty if it could convince a plaintiff to sue the co-conspirators, instead of it,
to collect damages. The plaintiff would have strong incentive to accept such
an offer, losing nothing in terms of recovery. Simultaneously, it would elimi-
nate a strong opponent from the litigation, thus increasing the probability of
actually winning the lawsuit and collecting damages.'"
"3 See text at notes 106-09 infra.
104 See text at notes 110-19 infra.
See text at notes 120-22 infra.
"" E.g., in Perma Life Mufflers Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134
(1968), a large corporate defendant instigated a price-fixing scheme which involved its
franchisees.
117 See Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Gas. at 79,706
(dissenting opinion). The dissenting judge suggested that this may have been the
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Similarly, private plaintiffs have been able to use the no contribution rule,
together with the principle of joint and several liability, to extract settlement
offers from defendants who would prefer to go to trial, but who cannot risk
massive liability based on the sales or activities of other defendants, who either
settled earlier or were left unsued." 8 Under the prevailing view, each time a
defendant settles for less than his proportionate share of the damages, the
amount of the eventual judgment is reduced only by the amount of the set-
tlement, not by the settling defendant's proportionate share of the total liabil-
ity.'" Thus, the non-settling defendants' share of the total remaining liability
increases. Furthermore, the longer a defendant resists settlement, the greater
his risk of being held liable for damages far in excess of his proportionate
liability. A defendant who steadfastly maintains his innocence thus may be
forced to settle, thereby subverting the judicial process and the antitrust laws.
The policy of deterring anticompetitive behavior also supports the Prtfes-
sional rule. In contrast to previously held views, a strong argument can be
made that contribution may actually promote the deterrence of anticompeti-
tive conduct.'" Consonant with the view taken in Professional, courts decid-
reason that Olson Farms was sued, and Safeway Stores, Inc. (a larger corporation) and
others were left unsued.
1U8 The problem regarding settlement was summarized in S. REP. No. 96-428, re-
printed in 942 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 2 (BNA) (Special Supp.) (December 6,
1979):
[PJlaintiff's counsel [can] settle relatively inexpensively with (or simply not
sue) some defendants (usually the large and most responsible or those who
want out as quickly as possible) and force the remaining defendants (often
those who have the best case or are in the poorest financial position—
usually the smaller companies) to settle at a higher rate rather than run the
risk of huge liability for not only their own damages but also for the dam-
ages of those who opted out early and cheaply.
Id.
1 ° 9
 In contrast, the first district court to interpret the Professional decision in the
settlement context, Little Rock School Dist v. Borden, Inc., Nos. LR-76-C-41, LR-C-
77-126 and LR-C-77-108 (E.D. Ark. October 1, 1979), discussed in 937 ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. A-40–A-41 (BNA) (November I, 1979), indicated that, under Pro-
fessional, a settling defendant's sales would he eliminated from the litigation, Con-
sequently, the Little Rock court released the non-settling defendants from liability for
the settling defendant's actions. See also S. 1468 reprinted in 942 ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. 2-3 (BNA) (Special Supp.) (December 6, 1979), which in the event of partial
settlement, would reduce the amount of the plaintiff's claim against non-settling de-
fendants by the greater of the amount stipulated by the release or covenant, the
amount paid by the settling party in consideration for the release, or treble the actual
damages attributable to the settling party's sales or purchases of goods or services.
"° Corbett, supra note I I, at 140; and Cornell Note, supra note 27. Corbett made
the following argument in his 1962 article:
Not only would the existence of rights of contribution remove to a great extent
the possibility of escaping liability entirely, ... but it would, in a sense, acid vigor
to the enforcement of the antitrust laws by allowing the conspirators themselves
to ensure that all those participating in the unlawful action are appropriately
penalized.
* * *
The availability of contribution	 would not only be equitable as among
the conspirators, but should insure a fuller enforcement of the antitrust
laws without appreciably lessening the punitive effect of treble damage lia-
bility.
Corbett, supra note 11, at 137 & 140.
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ing the contribution issue in the securities area have perceived the redistribu-
tion of liability as a means of enhancing deterrence."' Facing the question of
whether to permit contribution in a case involving a section of the federal
securities law which did not provide expressly for contribution, the court in
Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. "2 stated:
Because of the deterrent policy of the securities laws, even inten-
tional tortfeasors may obtain contribution so that other tortfeasors
will not escape liability. This purpose will be served if defendant
tortfeasors are allowed to implead any other tortfeasor involved in
the frand." 3
This view has been echoed by other courts in securities cases where there was
no right to contribution by statute.'"
The securities cases provide a useful analogy to the contribution question
in the antitrust area. Although courts have been prone to distinguish antitrust
and securities cases on the basis of Congressional intent to allow contribution
vel non, as a practical matter, cases brought under the securities laws are simi-
lar to antitrust cases. Both types of cases have a tendency to become large and
complex."' More importantly, the securities and antitrust laws were enacted
for related reasons—the antitrust statutes to protect the public from anticom-
petitive business practices," 6 while the securities laws had the general purpose
of protecting investors against fraudulent business practices." 7 Thus, if con-
tribution is perceived as actually promoting the regulatory purpose of the
securities laws, it is hard to see how it could have a different result in the
antitrust area. The judicial implication of a right to contribution in antitrust
cases, viewed in this way, is consistent with the statutory purpose and goals of
the antitrust laws.'" The treble damages provided for in antitrust actions
make this conclusion even more likely. Because damages are trebled, the size
of the judgment should be large enough to represent substantial deterrence to
E .g. , Heizer Corp. v. Ross. 601 F.2d 330, 332 (7th Cir. 1979); Gould v.
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974); and Globus, Inc. v.
Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
385 F. Stipp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" 3 /d. at 238.
114 See note 111 supra.
"5 Professional Beauty Supply. Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d at
1184-85.
I 1" For a discussion of the general purpose of the antitrust statutes sec L. SULLIVAN,
•ANTITRUST § 3 at 14 (1977); H. TnoRELLE, THE FEDERAL. ANTITRUST POLICY 226-32
(1955) [hereinafter cited as Tnolumu].
'" The report of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated that "the
purpose of [the Securities Act of 1933] is to protect the investing public and honest
business." S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1. (1933).
11 ' MORELLI, supra note 116, emphasizes that Congress enacted the antitrust laws to
preserve competition. The increase in the number of parties facing liability under the
antitrust laws, a collateral effect of contribution, would enhance efforts to enforce the
antitrust laws against all violators. Thus, contribution may help insure a more competi-
tive economy.
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any antitrust defendant, even if liability were allocated among the co-
conspirators." "
Scholars and antitrust practitioners also support a contribution rule which
parallels the result reached in Professional. Prompted by the Eighth Circuit's
decision in Professional, the ABA's Antitrust Section has recommended model
legislation which would make contribution available to all antitrust vio-
lators.'" The section was impressed by the manifest unfairness of the no
contribution rule, and felt that any advantages in reduced court costs and
simplified litigation could not justify its retention."' For similar reasons, the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary has approved a bill, S. 1468, which would
allow contribution in price fixing cases.' 22 The approval of the contribution
remedy by the ABA and the Judiciary Committee buttresses the Professional
decision in two ways. First, neither the Judiciary Committee nor the ABA
indicated that the availability of contribution should depend on an antitrust
violator's intent. Thus, the Professional court's decision to make contribution
available to intentional and unintentional violators alike draws support from
these two groups. In fact the Judiciary Committee and the ABA go even
farther than Professional, which circumscribed the availability' of the remedy by
placing it within the court's discretion. Second, the argument made consis-
tently by proponents of the no contribution rule throughout the litigation on
this issue that Congress intended to deny contribution in the antitrust area,
collapses under the support for contribution voiced by the Senate Committee.
Although the Professional court was itself unconvinced by the congressional
intent argument even before the introduction of S. 1468, other decisions de-
nying contribution, especially Olson Farms and the earlier El Camino decision,
relied heavily on this argument for support. The approval of the contribution
remedy by the Senate Committee should henceforth effectively counter any
such contention.
CONCLUSION
The contribution rule adopted by the Eighth Circuit in Professional
achieves fairness for an antitrust defendant without conflicting with antitrust
principles. The Professional decision yields a number of positive effects. First,
it eliminates the automatic rule barring contribution in all antitrust cases,
thereby preventing the inequity of allowing one tortfeasor to shoulder the
judgment alone while other violators escape liability altogether. The abuse of
the no contribution rule by antitrust violators and plaintiffs is also eliminated.
"" Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,707 (dissent-
ing opinion), citing Dimas, LAw Or REMEDIES, § 10.6 at 704 (1973): "Mince damages
are trebled, there is quite a sufficient quantum of liability to punish ... [all
wrongdoers] by forcing them to share the liability."
12 " The Antitrust Section's report is reprinted in 936 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
E-1 (BNA) (October 25, 1979).
"I
 Id. at E- 2.
122 S. REP. No. 96-428, Antitrust Equal Enforcement Act of 1979, 96th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1979). reprinted in. 942 ANTITRUST & TRADE REC.. REP. I (BNA) (Special Supp.)
(December 6, 1979).
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Second, by allowing contribution, the deterrent effect of the antitrust laws
may actually be enhanced because more violators will be brought into actions
to face liability. Third, Professional's limitation on the availability of contribu-
tion by placing it within the district court's discretion prevents flagrant offend-
ers from taking advantage of the remedy. The deterrent effect gained by
statutory treble damages remains unchanged for these violators. Because the
Professional rule thus represents a careful balance of the contribution doctrine
and antitrust principles, it is preferable to the rigid approach of the other
circuits in Abraham and Olson Farms.
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